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COMMENTS
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF GENERAL COVENANTS
OF RENEWAL
It is said to be one of the most fundamental concepts of the law
of contracts that in order to be enforceable, a contract must be definite
and certain.' That is, the promise or agreement of the parties to it must
be clear and explicit so that the nature and extent of the obligation may
be ascertained to a reasonable degree of certainty. It is evident that
unless such intention and obligations are sufficiently definite and certain,
courts will be unable to specifically enforce the agreement. 2
The subject of this paper is general covenants of renewal; a covenant
being defined as an agreement reduced to writing and executed under
seal, by which either of the parties thereto pledges himself to the other
that some act shall or shall not be done.3 Under the more modern view,
a covenant need not be under seal.4 It is thus apparent that covenants of
renewal are creatures of contract law, and are subject to the same
demands of definiteness and certainty as are other types of contracts.
In a recent case, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held a three-
year mortgage-note containing the clause, "note to be renewed until paid
in full," to be enforceable. The court said the renewal clause implied
a single renewal period of three years, and thus it was sufficiently
definite and certain. 5 This decision is illustrative of the problem with
which this article is concerned. The scope of the article is restricted to
those general covenants of renewal which are incorporated into the
instrument to which they appertain. The questions of the necessity of
notice of renewal, or the effect of holding over by a tenant in a lease
case 6 and those cases in which the renewal is conditioned on other out-
side factors,7 will not be considered here.
The decision of the Wisconsin Court in the Sardino case raises an
immediate question as to when such renewal clauses are so uncertain
and indefinite that they are thereby rendered unenforceable. The
Wisconsin decision would seem to be clearly violative of the funda-
113 C. J. CONTRACTS 1936 §59; 6 R.C.L. 643 §59; 1 WiLLISTON, CONTRACTS §49
(Rev. ed.) 1936; GRis oRE, CONTRACTS §25 (1947); CORBIN, CONTRACTS §16
(1952) ; Baurman v. Binzen, 16 N.Y.S. 342 (1891) ; Re Friese, 336 Pa. 241, 9
A.2d 401 (1939); Carthell v. Summit Thread Co., 132 Me. 94, 167 Atl. 79
(1933).2 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §32 (1932).
3Atlantic Pacific Oil Co. of Montana v. Gas Development Co., 105 Mont. 1,
69 P.2d 750, 756 (1937); De Grasse v. Verona Mining Co., 185 Mich. 514,
152 N.W. 242 (1915).
4 C.J. COVENANTS §2; 7 R.C.L. 1084 §2.
5 Riepl v. Sardino, 162 Wis. 131, 56 N.W.2d 493 (1953).
6 See Note 29 L.R.A.(N.S.) 174 (1911); L.R.A. 1916E, 1232, 1237.
7 See Note 41 L.R.A.(N.s.) 387 (1912).
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mental contract requirement of definiteness. In considering this ques-
tion, it is obvious that ours is a problem of judicial construction. This
problem, in turn, involves two additional questions, namely; just how
long a term or period of time is such a renewal clause intended to
cover, and second, how many renewals are intended by such a
covenant?
Because these renewal clauses are creatures of contract the so-called
rules of construction which the courts apply to contract problems are
equally applicable to the problem at hand." There are many such con-
struction rules,9 but just a few need be noted here. The cardinal rule in
the construction of contracts is to ascertain the intention of the parties
as it is expressed in the language used.10 Just as important perhaps, is
the rule that if two different interpretations are possible, one which
would render the agreement meaningless and the other would make its
meaning reasonable and fair, the court will adopt the latter con-
struction."1 This latter rule is well founded, in that it may be logically
presumed that parties to a contract do not intend to agree to meaning-
less things. Further consideration of the problem involved in this
paper will disclose the reason .why there is a third rule which is apropos,
namely: where words or phrases having a definite legal meaning and
effect are used in a contract, the parties to such contract will be pre-
sumed to have intended them to have their proper legal meaning and
effect in the absence of anything in the contract showing the intention
to use them in a different sense. 2
This problem of interpreting renewal clauses has arisen most fre-
quently in the field of leases. This is due to the fact that the device is
employed in that field more often than in any other. For the same
reason, the field of leases affords the best place for beginning an analysis
of the problems involved in renewal clauses. There can be no doubt that
provisions or agreements for the renewal of leases are valid and en-
forceable; if the renewal agreement is incorporated into the lease itself
it is clearly supported by the same consideration as that which supports
the lease.'3 These agreements of renewal must be definite and certain
sLauntz v. Kinloch Tel. Co., 239 I1. App. 204 (1925); Butt v. Zabelien
Brewery Co., 6 Cal.App. 581, 92 P.2d 652 (1907); Kaufmann v. Liggett,
209 Pa. 87, 58 Ati. 129 (1904); Swank v. St. Paul City Rwy. Co., 72 Minn.
380, 75 N.W. 594 (1898).
9 See 12 Am. JuR. CONTRACTS §226.
10 12 Am. JUR. CONTRACTS §227; Richmond Mining Co. v. Eureka Min. Co.,
103 U.S. 839 (1881); Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Commercial Bank, 15 Wis.
424, 82 Am. Dec. 689 (1862).1112 AM. JUR CONTRATS §251; Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghamton Bridge Co.,
3 Wall. 51 (U.S. 1866); Hunt v. Hunt, 119 Ky. 39, 82 S.W. 998 (1904);
Schofield v. Zion Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 85 Utah 281, 39 P.2d 342 (1934).12 Rothschild v. Weinthel, 191 Ind. 85, 131 N.E. 917, 132 N.E. 687 (1921); See
Note 12 L.R.A. 375 (1891) ; REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §234 (1932).
13 See Note 16 R.C.L. 884, §388.
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in order to be enforceable and binding upon the parties. 14 Because of
this requirement, the great majority of courts will hold a renewal
clause based "on terms to be agreed upon" to be void and unenforce-
able.' 5
The first time a general covenant of renewal was submitted to
judicial review, the New York Court held such a provision in a lease
to be totally void for uncertainty. The Court went on to say however,
"How far this uncertainty might be obviated by a bill in the
Court of Chancery to which the decision of this point properly
appertains, I do not know..."I'
In Wisconsin the first case to present this point to the Court was that of
Boyle v. Laird." There, the Court considered a one year lease con-
taining the phrase, "subject to be renewed." The court said:
"It is true, the lease contained a provision for renewal but
upon what terms and for what length of time the lease should
be renewed, it is altogether silent, and we think that this provision
or covenant is void for uncertainty, as it appears in the lease."
Thus, it may be readily observed that these tribunals considered the
requirement of certainty to be a very stringent one.
It was, however, just six years after the Radcliff decision in New
York that a Court of Chancery of that state was presented with a like
question. Chancellor Kent considered a lease with a covenant which
provided the lessor would, at the expiration of the term of the lease,
either pay for the buildings erected by the lessee, redemise the property
at such terms and rent as might be agreed upon between the parties, or
he would renew the lease. The Chancellor considered the Radcliff
decision but distinguished it on its facts and then held that the covenant
to "renew" implied a renewal upon the same terms and rent as provided
in the original lease, with the exception of the covenant to renew. In
explaining this one exception he said:
"If a covenant to renew the lease, necessarily included a renewal
of all the covenants in it, it would be tantamount to a covenant
for perpetual renewal, and so extraordinary a covenant ought not
to depend on inference merely."' 8
This decision by Chancellor Kent is generally conceded to be the leading
case in the United States on the rule that a general covenant of renewal
in a lease implies but one renewal for the same period of time as that
provided in the original lease.
14 Streit v. Fay, 230 Ill. 319, 82 N.E. 648 (1907) ; Abeel v. Radcliff, infra note 16.
15 Tracy v. Albany Exhng., 7 N.Y. 474 (3 Seld. 472) (1852) ; Carlson v. Johnson,
275 Mich. 35, 265 N.W. 517 (1936); See Note 32 L.R.A.(N.s.) 201 (1911).
16Abeel v. Radcliff, 13 Johns Rep. (N.Y.) 297 (1816).
'172 Wis. 316, *431 (1853).
I Rutgers v. Hunter, 6 Johns Ch. 215 (N.Y. 1822).
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In allowing only one renewal, the court was following a long
standing policy of the courts against interpretations of contracts which
tend to create rights in perpetuity.19 The first case to be decided which
touched upon this precise question was that decided in 1715.20 In this
case the English Court construed a lease which contained a covenant
providing the lessor should grant such further lease as the lessee or his
heirs should desire, to be a covenant for perpetual renewals. Just eight
years later a similar covenant in a lease was said not to import a per-
petual renewal. 21 After this, a distinct line of cases may be found which
cite with approval this latter decision.2 2 In 1796 Sir Richard Pepper
Arden observed:
"I collect from these cases, this: that the courts in England, at
least, lean against construing a covenant to be for a perpetual
renewal, unless it is perfectly clear that the covenant does mean
it.,,23
And in 1807 the rule was stated:
"Covenants for perpetual renewal, if fairly entered into and
distinctly expressed are no doubt valid; but if the language of
such covenants be not perfectly unambiguous a court of equity
will never adopt a construction which would lead to a perpetuity
of leasehold interests.
24
This rule of construction has since become so well established in the
law, that the courts refer to it with the comment that it is needless to
cite authority for it. Lord Ellenborrough illustrates the attitude of the
courts when they are confronted with such a problem of construction
as that with which we are concerned.
".... the case on the part of the plaintiff supposes that it was the
intention of the parties to express what, if they had so intended,
194 KENT ColtM. *109; Abeel v. Radcliff, supra note 16; See Note 3 A.L.R. 498
(1919).2 0 Bridges v. Hitchcock, (1715) 5 Bro. P.C. 6, 2 Eng. Rep. 498.
21 Hyde v. Skinner, (1723) 2 P.Wms. 196, 24 Eng. Rep. 697.
22 Davis v. Taylor's Co. (1736) 3 Ridgeway P.C. 395; Russel v. Darwin, (1767)
2 Bro. C.C. 639; Tritton v. Foote, (1789) 2 Bro. C.C. 636, 29 Eng. Rep. 352;
Earl of Inchquin v. Burnell (1794) 3 Ridgeway 376; Baynham v. Guy's Hosp.
(1796) 3 Ves. Jr. 295, 30 Eng. Rep. 1019; Moore v. Foley (1801) 6 Ves. Jr.
232, 31 Eng. Rep. 1027; Clinan v. Cook (1802) 1 Sch. & Lef. 558; Harnett v.
Yielding (1805) 2 Sch. & Lef. 558; Iggulden v. May (1806) 7 East 237,
103 Eng. Rep. 91; City of London v. Mitford (1807) 14 Ves. 41, 33 Eng. Rep.
437; Willan v. Willan (1809) 16 Ves. 72, 216, 33 Eng. Rep. 911, 966; Lewis v.
Stephenson (1898) 67 LJ(Q.B.) 296, 31 Digest 70, 2178. ~723 Baynham v. Guy's Hosp.,,jbid.
24 City of London v. Mitfoid, supra note 22; this is still the rule in the U.S.,
see Note 3 A.L.R. 395 (1919) ; but in England since 1925 perpetually renew-
able leases have been abolished. (see law of Property Act, 1922(12 & 13 Geo.5
c.16), s.145, Sched. XV, paras.1(1),(5) which came into operation on Jan. 1,
1926. If a lease contains a renewal amounting to a covenant for perpetual
renewal, the lease now takes effect as a demise for a term of 2000 years;
Parkus v. Greenwo6d (1950) Ch. 644, 66 (pt.1) T.L.R. 496, 1 All. E. R. 436,
C.A.
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might have been expressed, without difficulty or ambiguity, by
words which would have obviously have occurred to the most
inexperienced draftsman. ' '25
The reason for this predeliction on the part of the courts to refuse to
interpret a covenant as requiring a perpetuity of renewals unless the
language implying that is utterly devoid of all ambiguity is not difficult
to perceive. The intention of the parties is clearly the controlling factor
and it is hardly reasonable in most cases, at least, to construe such
clauses as manifesting the intention to convey a fee, which, de facto, is
the result of a perpetual series of renewals. The courts have said that
such construction of renewal clauses in the absence of a showing of a
proper consideration is hardly reasonable.2 6
This policy of the courts to refuse to imply a perpetual right of
renewal from a general clause is manifestly the basis of the New York
decision27 that a general covenant of renewal implies but one renewal;
its construction of the term of such a clause is, however, founded upon
a different basis.
The English rule that a general covenant of renewal implies the
same terms and covenants as the original lease is first found in a
dictum of Lord Abinger in 1834.28 However, the best statement of the
reasoning which underlies this interpretation of such a general clause
is that of Sir Knight Bruce the Vice Chancellor in the case of Rickards
v. Rickards.2 9 Sir Bruce was there considering the definiteness of such
a clause when he said:
"That turns upon the meaning of the word 'renewal'.... The
word 'renewal' is a relative term, which of necessity requires to
be construed by reference to something else. . . . By reference
to what? To the lease that he has at the moment; it can be con-
strued with reference to nothing else .... I take it that the term
'renewal' means a renovation-a restoration of something to a
former or original state-a repetition-a beginning again; it may
mean each or either of those things so far as there is any differ-
ence between them; it must however, be a renewal, a renovation
or repetition or restoration of the same subject so far as it is
possible to restore that subject. A renewal of a lease, where the
contract does not require any different interpretation to be given
to it, must therefore mean the obtaining of a lease as near as
possible in every practical circumstance to the existing lease-as
if the subject, worn, or wearing out, was to begin again."
2S Iggulden v. May, supra note 22.
26 Ibid. and cases cited at note 22; See Note ANN. CAS. 1916C 1096.
27 Rutgers v. Hunter, supra note 18.
28Price v. Assheton, (1834) 1 Y.&C. Exch. 82, 160 Eng. Rep. 34; The Chief
Baron's statement was dictum because it was based on the premise that the
clause under discussion was one of renewal whereas it was later held not to
be such by Alderson in 1 Y.&C. Exch. 441, 160 Eng. Rep. 180. The dictum
was recognized and expressly approved by Bruce J. in Lewis v. Stephensone,
supra note 22.
29 (1843) 2 Y.& C. C.C. 427, 160 Eng. Rep.
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This is the rationale of the rule which has been followed in a great
number of cases in England and in the United States as well."0 Thus
it is observed that the basis of the Rutger's case in New York is found
to have been developed in two separate lines of cases, that following the
Skinner case 3' and that illustrated by the Rickard case.32 The opinion
of Chancellor Kent in the Rutger's case has been noted, approved and
followed in many subsequent decisions in New York,3 3 and other
jurisdictions.3
In Massachusetts, in the first of many cases to express this rule,
the court interpreted a general covenant of renewal as importing a new
lease like the old one with the same terms and stipulations, at the same
rent and with all the essential covenants contained therein. Though the
phrase, ex vi termini, was not to be found in the clause in dispute, the
court implied its presence, holding the above rule to express its
meaning.35
In 1875,36 the Michigan Court adopted this rule of leases and in the
year 1882, North Carolina, after deciding the words "refusal of the
premises" addressed to the lessee, is a renewal clause, held the lessee to
have the election to rent or not, on the same terms and conditions and
to pay the same rent as found in the original lease.37 The Indiana
Court put itself in line with these cases in 1894 when it held that a
renewal contract must be deemed to contemplate the same terms of the
rental for the renewal period. 38 The court went on to say that "other-
wise the privilege would be mere idle words, and the continuance of
the tenancy would be entirely at the option of the lessor, instead of the
lessee because he could easily make the rent prohibitive." One of the
more outstanding decisions to establish this rule in its jurisdiction was
that of Kollock v. Scribner39 in Wisconsin. In this case, decided in
1897, the court- considered the Laird case,40 and said that it had never
30 Indian Head Mills v. Hamilton, 212 Ala. 97, 101 So. 747 (1924); Keating v.
Michael, 154 Ark. 267, 242 S.W. 563 (1922); Karn v. Di Lorenzo, 95 Conn.
267, 111 At. 195 (1920); Obrien v. Hurley, 325 Mass. 249, 90 N.E.2d 335(1950) ; Gardella v. Greenburg, 242 Mass. 405, 136 N.E. 106 (1922) ; Leavitt v.
Maykel, 203 Mass. 506, 89 N.E. 1056 (1909); Starr v. Holck, 318 Mich. 452,
28 N.W.2d 289 (1947); Drake v. Board of Education, 208 Mo. 540, 106 S.W.
650 (1907); Austin v. Newham (1906) 2 K.E.B.(Eng.) 167, 75 L.J.K.B. 563.
3
3 Hyde v. Skinner, supra note 21.
3 Rickard v. Rickard, supra note 29.
33 Piggot v. Mason, 1 Paige 412 (1829) ; Carr v. Ellison, 20 Wend. 178 (1838);
Whitlock v. Duffield, 1 Hoffm. Ch. 110 (affd.26 Wend.55) (1839); Robinson
v. Kettletas, 4 Edw. Ch. 67 (1842); Willis v. Astor, 4 Edw. Ch. 594 (1844);
Tracy v. Albany Exch., 7 N.Y. (3 Seld. 472) 472 (1852); Ryder v. Jenny,
2 Robt. 56 (1864); Muhlenbrinck v. Pooler, 40 Hun. 526 (1886).
3- See cases cited in note 30.
35 Cunningham v. Pattee, 99 Mass. 248 (1868).
36 Brand v. Frumveller, 32 Mich. 215 (1875).
37 McAdoo v. Callum, 86 N.C. *419 (1882).
38 Hughes v. Windpfenning, 10 Ind. App. 122, 37 N.E. 432 (1894).
39 98 Wis. 104, 73 N.W. 776 (1897).
40 Boyle v. Laird, supra note 17.
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been supported in subsequent cases in Wisconsin or in any other re-
putable jurisdiction. The court then overruled the earlier case and said
that a general covenant of renewal in a lease will be held to refer to
the terms of the lease in which it is used so as to be in effect, an
agreement to renew on the precise terms and conditions of that lease
with the exception of the covenant to renew. This decision was later
cited and approved by the Wisconsin Court in Fergen v. Lyons.41 Thus,
it is apparent from a reading of the cases that this rule first stated in
the Rutgers case, is now the law in England and throughout the
United States.
There is another field of law in which the use of renewal clauses is
quite prominent, that of commercial paper. Having determined the rule
as it appertains to general renewal clauses in leases, we may now turn
our attention to the use and effect of these clauses in their application
in commercial instruments. The principal reason for an inquiry into
this field in this paper is to ascertain the effect of such a renewal clause
when applied to a species of commercial paper such as a promissory
note; negotiable, or non-negotiable. 42 The question which manifests
itself immediately is whether the rule of construction so uniformly
applied in the field of leases is applicable to commercial paper as well.
In the event such a rule is apropos to commercial instruments, a cor-
ollary question arises as to the effect its application would have in this
field.
In 1881, the Wisconsin Court in considering a note containing the
words "This note to be extended if desired by the makers" held that
clause to be so indefinite as to be without legal significance. 43 Much
later, however, in the case of Duggan v. Krevonick 4 cited by the
Wisconsin Court in the Sardino case,45 a land contract providing that
the deferred part of the purchase price was to be payable in three years
"with the privilege of renewal" was held to be sufficiently certain and
definite. The renewal provision was held to contemplate a renewal for
three years and only one renewal. The court cited the lease rule with
apparent approval and applied its construction to the instrument at hand.
In a much earlier decision the Massachusetts Court construed an in-
dorsement on a note to be sufficiently definite and certain and said:
"The words 'I renew the within note' means something more
than the words 'I admit the within note to be due.' A common
meaning of the word 'renew' is to make again, as to renew a
treaty or a covenant. 46
41 162 Wis. 131, 155 N.W. 935 (1916).
42 See Goodrich, Nonnegotiable Bills and Notes, 5 IowA L. BULL. 65 (1920)
8 C.J. BILLS & NOTES §§50, 51; 1 RANDOLF, C*MMERCIAL PAPER §177 (1886).
43 Krouskopus v. Shonty, 51 Wis. 204 (1881).
44 169 Va. 57, 192 S.E. 737 (1937).
45 Riepl v. Sardino, supra note 5.
46Daggett v. Daggett, 124 Mass. 149 (1878).
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In this case also, the court went on to draw an analogy between a note
and a lease in their relation to renewals.
In reference to negotiable instruments as distinguished from non-
negotiable instruments the controlling law is set forth in the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Act which has been adopted substantially by all
the forty-eight states, and the Bills of Exchange Act of England. Case
law is controlling in this field only in the event that the rulings of such
cases are not covered by the NIL. This paper is concerned only with
the provisions of the NIL set out in sections 1 and 4(2) of the Model
Act.47 The question arises whether such a general covenant of renewal
as has been under discussion renders a commercial instrument non-
negotiable. Stated in the language of the Act, the question is whether
an instrument containing such a clause is payable on or before a fixed
or determinable future time specified therein.
An early decision of the Iowa Court might throw some light on
this problem. Although the case was not decided on the precise point
in question, it is closely analogous and offers a well accepted interpreta-
tion of the meaning of the relevant provisions of the NIL. The court
held that an agreement to extend the time of payment of a note to a
certain date does not destroy the negotiability of an instrument. Speak-
ing of these provisions of the NIL, the court said that they were clearly
intended to allow flexibility in the.fixing of the time of payment. This
flexibility being conditioned only on the requirement that by its terms,
the note must certainly come due at some time. In other words, the Act
recognizes the right of the parties to an instrument to contract for their
mutual benefit, and if such a contract is to be performed at some future
date, certain to arrive, its negotiability is not destroyed.48 The words of
justice Shaw of Massachusetts illustrate the position of the courts, prior
to the NIL, to be in substantial accord with the current view of the
law.4
9
There have been very few cases decided on the precise question
under discussion. Many of those cases which do involve the con-
struction and effect of renewal clauses in commercial instruments regard
the problem solely in the light of the effect of such clauses on the rights
47 Section 1. "An instrument to be negotiable must conform to the following
requirements :***
(3) Must be payable on demand, or at a fixed or determinable
future time ;***"
Section 4. "An instrument is payable at a determinable future time within
the meaning of this act, which is expressed to be payable***
(2) On or before a fixed or determinable future time specified
therein ;***"
48 State Bank of Halstad v. Bilstad, 162 Iowa 433, 136 N.W. 204 (1912).
49 "The true test of the negotiability of a note seems to be whether the under-
takings of the promisor to pay the amount at all events, at some time which
may certainly come, and not out of a particular fund or upon a contingent
event." Cota v. Buck, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 588 (1840).
19531
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
and duties of sureties, 50 an inquiry which is outside the scope of this
paper. There are, however, a limited number of cases51 which have
touched squarely on the issue under discussion; and most of these seem
to hold such clauses to render the instrument non-negotiable. The basis
of these decisions is generally the view of the courts that such clauses
enable the parties to extend indefinitely so that the instrument may
never become due. The following clause within a note has been held to
render the note non-negotiable: "This note is given for advancements
and it is the understanding it will be renewed at maturity.' '52 Britton,
in his excellent work on Bills and Notes, in discussing this decision says:
"If this language could be construed to mean that the note should
be renewed for the same period as originally specified, upon the
election of the maker it should be negotiable, for it is but a note
for the longer period subject to call at a specified date and clearly
negotiable under Sec. 4(2). ' 53
The crux of the problem under discussion now becomes quite apparent
in the light of Britton's observation. If his view of the law is correct,
and there appears to be no logical reason why it is not, then the appli-
cation of the rule of Rutgers v. Hunter,54 to commercial paper would
supply the precise rule of construction he contemplates. Consideration
of the rationale which underlies that rule as it has been applied to the
law of leases reveals that the same rationale applies just as logically in
the law of commercial instruments. This rule of leases, that a renewal
clause implies the same terms and covenants as provided in the original
lease is really a rule of semantics. The courts, in other words, have held
that general renewal clauses by their very definition imply a revitaliza-
tion of the old lease; even more succinctly, the term 'renewal' means
what it says.
As it might be expected, the courts have not been oblivious to this
interpretation of the term "renewal" even in its application in fields
other than leases. There would seem to be no logical reason why this
meaning of the term should apply solely when it is employed in a lease.
In addition to the Krevonick55 and the Daggett5" cases which have been
5o Cf. Navjo County Bank v. Dolson, 163 Cal. 485, 126 Pac. 153 (1912); Sioux
Nat. Bank v. Lundberg, 54 S.D. 581, 223 N.W. 826 (1929); Farmer, Thomp-
son & Helsell v. Bank of Graettinger, 130 Iowa 469, 107 N.E. 170 (1906);
First Nat. Bank v. Buttery, 17 N.D. 326, 116 N.W. 341 (1908); See Notes 16
L.R.A.(N.s.) 878; 17 ANN. CAs. 520 (1908).
51 Miller v. Poage, 56 Iowa 96, 8 N.W. 799 (1881); Woodbury v. Roberts, 59
Iowa 348, 13 N.W. 312 (1882) ; Quinn v. Bane, 182 Iowa 843, 164 N.W. 788
(1917) ; Osborne v. Millikan, 140 Kan. 592, 38 P.2d 104, noted in 15 B. U. L.
REv. 297; See Aigler, Time Certainty in Negotiable Paper, 77 U. PA. L. REV.
316 (1929) and cases cited therein.
52 Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Piollet, 126 Pa. 194, 17 Atl. 603 (1889).
53 BarrToN, BILLS AND Noms 114 n.1 (1943).
54 Supra, note 18.
55Supra, note 44.
56 Supra, note 46.
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discussed above, some courts57 have taken direct notice of this inter-
pretation of the term "renewal" and although many of these decisions
may not be in point due to differences in their fact situations, they are
of definite value here as illustrative of the fact that the quoted meaning
of the word in question applies as well to the field of commercial instru-
ments as it does to the field of leases. In an often cited opinion, the
Indiana Court construed a renewal clause of a mortgage-note in this
manner:
"'Renewed' or 'renewal' as applied to promissory notes, in
commercial and legal parlance means something more than the
substitution of another obligation for the old one. It means to
re-establish a particular contract for another period of time. It
means to restore to its former conditions an obligation on which
the time of payment has been extended imparting continued or
new force and effect; to make again ....5 5,
These words have been quoted in their entirety or with little variation
by courts of many other jurisdictions.59 The similarity of the wording
of this interpretation of the term "renewal" in the Petty case 0 to that of
Knight Bruce in the Rickard case 61 and to that of the Massachusetts
Court in the Pattee decision 62 is not just coincidental. In 1852 a case
involving a promissory note containing the endorsements, "(date)
Received, Renewed" was put before the Supreme Court of Maine. The
court said that the word "renewed" as endorsed on a note may be
considered as meaning that the note should be considered as if made in
the same terms anew from the renewal date. 63
Although the cases cited and referred to herein are not exhaustive
of those available they do illustrate that the courts have considered the
term "renewal" as having the same meaning in both the field of leases
and that of commercial paper. Since the most fundamental reason
expressed by these courts for adopting this rule in the law of leases is
the very definition of the term itself, it would seem to follow quite
logically that this same reasoning is equally apropos to commercial
paper. This view might be clarified by a few fundamental ob-
servations. The only reason there is any need to construe such a clause
in either field of law is the requirement of definiteness and certainty.
This requirement as it is found in each of these fields springs from the
57 Lowry Nat. Bank v. Fickett, 122 Ga. 489, 50 S.E. 396 (1905); Parchen v.
Chessman, 53 Mont. 430, 164 Pac. 531 (1917); W. R. Grace & Co. v. Strick-
land, 188 N.C. 369, 124 S.E: 856 (1924); Dyer v. Bray, 208 N.C. 248, 180 S.E.
83 (1935) ; Guie v. Byers, 95 Wash. 492, 164 Pac. 75, 76 (1917) ; Lime Rock
Bank v. Mallett, infra note 63.
58 Kedey v. Petty, 153 Ind. 179, 54 N.E. 798, 800 (1899).
59 Supra, note 57.
60 Supra, note 58.
61 Supra, note 29.6 2 Supra, note 35.
63 Lime Rock Bank v. Mallett, 34 Me. 547, 56 Am. Dec. 673 (1852).
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same common source, the law of contracts. The practical basis for this
requirement of certainty and definiteness is to enable a court to enforce
the agreement should the need arise; this basis is the same in the law
of contracts, leases or commercial paper.
The recent Wisconsin decision of Rieple v. Sardino,64 seems to have
decided exactly the same thing. In that case, which was one of first
impression in Wisconsin, the court apparently took the rule of con-
struction of renewal clauses from the law of leases and applied it in
specie to the law of promissory notes. The negotiability of the note in
that case was not in issue for the note was still in the hands of the
original parties. 65 However, in view of the foregoing observations,
there is no reason to presume that had the note passed to a third party
and its negotiability been put in issue, the court would have arrived at
any different decision.
There is another approach to this question of construction which
has not as yet been mentioned. This approach might be nominated as
the "reasonable time approach." In ordinary contracts for performance
where ambiguities have arisen, this mode of construction is often
utilized by the courts.6 6 It is submitted, however, that no matter how
well this might work in the interpretation of renewal clauses in an
ordinary contract or even possibly in a lease, it would not be a satis-
factory rule with reference to commercial instruments. Both the Law
Merchant, which is said to apply to non-negotiable instruments, and the
NIL are very explicit in their demands that the time of payment be
certain or at least determinable.6 7 A fundamental reason for this
demand of certainty is to be found in the very reason for the existence
of commercial instruments, that of facility of transfer or negotiation
with the least amount of danger to the parties concerned. If a note is
not in its terms sufficiently clear as to its maturity date, certainly this
purpose has not been attained. Therefore, if the "reasonable time
approach" were to be applied to commercial instruments the certainty
demanded would not be attaified. Just what is a reasonable time would
have to be decided in court and in such a case, how could the parties
to an instrument ascertain at the time of execution just what the court
would find to be reasonable? Where a court adopts the lease rule to
commercial instruments, it is submitted, the certainty and definiteness
demanded by the NIL will be attained.
64 Supra, note 5.
65 Gross v. Von Dolcke, 313 Mich. 132, 20 N.W.2d 838 (1945) "As between the
original parties it is immaterial whether the instrument is negotiable or non-
negotiable."
G6 See A & R Realty Co. v. N.W. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 95 F.2d 703 (8th Cir.
1938); Nunez v. Dautel, 86 U.S. 560 (1873); Van Stone v. Stillwell Co.
142 U.S. 128 (1891) ; Banque Russo-Asiatique v. Doclch 3 F.2d 266 (9th Cir.
1925).
G, See cases cited at note 51 supra.
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As the Sardino decision" illustrates, the use of renewal clauses is
not restricted to those categories of the law already discussed, but at
least in their effect, they extend to the field of mortgages. A search of
the cases discloses no decision in the mortgage field which is decided on
the precise question of construction with which this paper is concerned.
Perhaps the reason for this absence of decisions is to be found in the
fundamental concepts of mortgages:
"that the debt is the principal thing, and the mortgage the mere
incident following the debt wherever it goes and deriving its
character from the instrument which evidences the debt."69
A mortgage is considered as a mere security device,7 0 it is said to be a
mere shadow of the debt which it secures. This concept is carried even
further in the idea that it is the debt itself that is secured and not the
evidence of the debt,7 1 in most cases a promissory note. A necessary
corollary to this second principal is the holding of the majority of the
courts that a change in the form of the obligation, e.g. substitution of a
new note for the old one, or changes in the maturity date, etc., do not
affect the mortgage so long as the secured debt itself is not destroyed.
7 2
From these considerations of the principles of mortgage law, it may be
observed that the validity of a renewal clause, or its construction is not
often found to be strictly within the purview of the law of mortgages.
In other words, if a renewal clause in a note, which is secured by a
mortgage, is construed to be sufficiently definite and certain to be en-
forceable, then it should follow almost as a matter of course that the
mortgage securing that note is unaffected by this change in the form of
the secured debt. In the Sardino case,73 the Wisconsin Court has ap-
parently. based its decision on the same reasoning as that used here. It
has taken a well established rule of construction of leases and has
applied that rule to the construction of commercial instruments and
incidentally to the mortgage securing the commercial instrument. In
other words, the court has taken a rule from one part of the law of
contracts and applied that rule to another part of that same general
category of the law. Keeping in mind the relevant contract rules of
6sSupra, note 5.
69 Bailey v. Smith, 14 Ohio St. 396, 84 Am. Dec. 385 (1863) ; accord; Carpenter
v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271 (1872).7 0 Morris v. Bacon, 123 Mass. 58, 25 Am. Rep. 17 (1877); Ladue v. Detroit &
M.R.Co., 13 Mich. 380, 87 Am. Dec. 759 (1865) ; Mead v. York, 6 N.Y. 449,
57 Am. Dec. 467 (1852).71Fowler v. Bush, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 230 (1838); WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
1875F (Rev.Ed. 1936); Lierman v. O'Hara, 153 Wis. 140, 140 N.W. 1057
(1913).72 Tolman v. Smith, 85 Cal. 280, 287, 24 Pac. 743 (1898); Bunker v. Barron,
79 Me. 62, 8 Atl. 253 (1887); Foster v. Paine, 63 Iowa 85, 18 N.W. 699
(1884) ; Gravlee v. Lamkin, 120 Ala. 210, 24 So. 756 (1898) ; Lee v. Fletcher,
46 Minn. 49, 48 N.W. 456 (1891); and see note 13 MiNN. L. REv. 157 (1929).
73 Supra, note 5.
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construction, the general policies of the law, the current trends of the
courts to lean toward negotiability of commercial instruments and
toward liberality in problems of judicial construction, it is submitted
that the Wisconsin decision is a satisfactory approach to a vexatious
problem.
W. F. DONOVAN
